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Mercantile agencies are establishments which make a
business of ascertaining the home standing of a merchant from
intelligent and reliable sources; and furnishing such inform-
ation to their clients.
They were made necessary by the great extension of
the credit system upon which the business of the commercial
world is now conducted. Udder this system it is essential to
the safe conduct of business that the man from whom credit is
sought, should have some means of obtaining reliable informa-
tion concerning the responsibility of his customers, who in
the present age of business enterprise and great corporations,
may be scattered throughout every state of the Union.
Formerly large busines houses were obliged to get
this information as best. they could, and when obtained, it
was both unreliable and expensiv.e; smaller houses got along
without it, and lack of such information frequently caused
the ruin of what would otherwise have been a prosperous firm.
The American Agencies had their origin in the prac-
tice of a commercial traveller - Church - who collected in-
formation concerning the character and financial standing of
the merchants with whom he did business. At first he used
this information for his own benefit; later for the accommo-
dation of his friends. Finally he ga've up his business and
travelled for certain New York firms, devoting himnelf to the
work of ascertaining and furnishing them with information
concerning the standing of their customers.
This suggested to Lewis Tappan the idea of estab-
lishing an institution which should make a business of ascer-
taining and furnishing information of this character to its
clients. After the great financial panic of 1837 he estab-
lished in New York, in 1841, the first American agency,- "To
uphold, extend and render safe and profitable to all concern-
ed, the great credit system on which our country had thriven;
doing business with all the world, and using the capital of
(a)
the world to do it with."
That there were institutions of this nature in Eng-
land, prior to the establishment of Tappan's Agency in New
(b)
York, is proved by the report of a-case in 1826, in which Mr.
Foss, the Secretary of "The Society for the Protection of
Trade against Swindlers and Sharpers",- whose duty it was to
send to members printed reports for the purpose of denoting
and signifying to the members of the Society the names of
such persons as were deemed swindlers and sharpers,- was sued
for libel.
The American Agency was at first regarded with sus-
picion, as partaking of the nature of a system of espionage,
seemingly at variance with that idea of open dealing so char-
acteristic of our nature. But the way in which these agencies
have been conducted, the great want they supply in the corn-
mercial world, and the reliability of the information which
they furnish, has caused them to be regarded as indispensible
(a) Freeman Hunt, Hunt's Mag. Jan. 1851.
(b) Goldstein v. Foss, 12 Eng. Com. Law 252.
to the safe conduct of trade and business.
All the business men of rue country are rated in
these reports. Daily and weekly sheets of corrections and
changes are sent to the subscribers, in which are reported
all assignments made, judgments rendered, executions issued,
and mortgages recorded. The subscriber is informed, by an
asterisk placed after a name, in these sheets, t-at the
agency has information which will be imparted on inquiry, to
any subscriber who has a special interest in the person named.
The ratings and reports are made in cipher, to which each
subscriber has a key.
The wide circulation of these reports, the almost
universal reliance placed in them by the business community,
makes the credit and reputation of a merchant depend largely
on the rating which he is therein given. Thus they have the
power to work great good or harm, and although their part in
the development of the commercial and business interests of
the country entitles them to the greatest consideration; the
law, while not impairing their usefulness, is vigilant to re-
dress injury to the reputation or credit of a man, which they
may occasion in the abuse of their power, through fraud, neg-
ligence, or mistake.
THE QUESTION OF PRIVILEGE.
In the law of libel certain circumstances may furn-
ish a legal excuse for the publication of the libelous matter,
and although the libel may have worked injury, the plaintiff
has no redress if it can be shown that the communication was
made in good faith, by one in the performance of a duty or
obligation, to one having a special interest in the person
about whom the statement is made. In such a case the occasion
is said to be privileged, and the employment of the defamatory
matter on such occasions is excused on the grounds of public
policy.
Privileged occasions are said to be absolute and
conditional. In absolutely privileged occasions the law con-
clusively presumes that there was no malice, and no action
can be maintained. Such occasions are,- the legislator in
debate, the lawyer in his argument, and the judge in his op-
inion. A conditionally privileged occasion is one in which
the presumption raised by the law that there is no malice, is
prima facie, and may be rebutted by proof of bad faith.
(a)
In Seldon v. Lewis the court said that,- "The term
privileged as applied to a communication alleged to be libel-
ous means simply that the circumstances under which it was
made were such as to repel the legal inference of malice and
to throw upon the plaintiff the burden of offering some evi-
dence of its existence, beyond the falsity of the charge."
(a) Seldon v. Lewis, 16 N. Y. 373.
(a)
Cooley says that the cases falling within this
classification "are those in which a party has a duty to dis-
charge which requires that he should be allowed to speak free-
ly and fully that which he believes, where he is himself dir-
octly interested in the subject matter of the communication
and makes it with a view to the protection or advance of his
own interest, or where he is communicating confidentially
with the person interested in the communication and by way of
advice or admonition."
(a) Cooley Con. Lim. 532.
THE QUESTION OF AGENCY.
In this class are placed the confidential communi-
cations between a principal and his agent. It is here that
the reports of the mercantile agency belong, for they are re-
ports of an agent to a principal on matters pertaining to the
principal's business.
The court considered the question of agency in the
(a)
case of Ormsby v. Douglas. "Laying aside for the moment the
circumstances in this case,- that defendant made it his bus-
iness to seek such information. It is clear that it is law-
ful before discounting a note of the plaintiff, for the wit-
ness to call on defendant for information respecting his stand-
ing and it was entirely lawful for the defendant to give him
all the information he had on the subject. It is, in a just
sense, a duty which one member of a community owes to another
for mutual protection and benefit and the law will recognize
it as such, by holding it privileged."
Any business which a principal may lawfully do him-
self, he may delegate to his agent. It was lawful for the
principal to seek this information himself, therefore it was
lawful for him to employ an agent to seek it for him. In
(b)
Washburn v. Cooke the court said, "If one merchant may employ
his own private agent, there is no legal objection to the com-
bination or union of two or more in the employment of the
same agent. And as a consequence, if an agent may act for
(a) Ormsby v. Douglas, 37 N. Y. 484.
(b) Washburn v. Cooke, 3 Denio 110.
7
several, he may make the pursuit of such information his occu-
pation and receive from those who desire to avail themselves
of his services and his knowledge acquired in such occupa-
tion, a compensation therefor."
The decisions of the courts were not at first uni-
form on this point. So distinguished an author as Cooley has
sought to bring in the distinction between the agent who re-
ceives a compensation, and one who does not. "Where confi-
dential inquiries are made concerning the character and con-
duct of servants, the responsibility of tradesmen, and the
like, by one having an interest in knowing, and of one who
may be supposed to have had special opportunity in his own
dealings or affairs to acquire the information, the answers
are, in a like manner privileged. But if one makes it his
business to furnish to others information concerning the char-
acter, habits, standing, and responsibility of tradesmen, his
business is not priveleged, and he must justify his reports
(a)
by the truth.! The weight of authority and the tend of modern
decisions, however, have been to the contrary. The facts
that the agent received a compensation, and that he makes the
(b)
collection of such information his occupation, are immaterial.
(a) Cooley, Law of Torts, p 217.
(b) Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188.
TO WHAT EXTENT THE REPORTS ARE PRIVILEGED.
All answers to inquiries made by a subscriber con-
cerning the standing of some business man in whom he is in-
terested as.between the subscriber ahd the agency, are pri-
(al
vileged. (b)
The Court of Appeals states the law thus,- "While
the law authorizes actions of slander to be maintained to
vindicate the reputation and character of individuals who
have been wrongfully and unjustly assailed, it also upholds
the principle that, in certain cases, communications between
individuals are regarded as privileged and are, therefore,
protected from the assumption of malice, which is usually to
be inferred from the charge itself. In actions of slander,
if it be made to appear that the defendant had just occasion
to speak the words, then malice is not to be presumed and
some additional evidence is necessary to establish the charge.
The rule is well settled that a communication which would other-
wise be slanderous and actionable, is priveleged if made in
good faith, upon a matter involving an interest or duty of
the party making it, though such duty may not be strictly
legal, but of imperfect obligation, to a person having a cor-
responding duty or interest, and this principle applies to an
agent, employed to procure information, as to the solvency,
credit and standing of another, who communicates confidential-
(a) Mitchell v. Bradstreet, 22 S. W. Rep. 358.
(b) Ormsby v. Douglas, 37 N. Y. 477.
ly and in good faith the information obtained to his princi-
pal, who has an interest in the matter."
But the false report published in a notification
sheet or report, and sent to all the subscribers of the agen-
cy, only a few of whom have an interest in it, is privileged
only so far as made to those who have such financial interest
in the person concerning whose standing the statement is made.
(a)
To them it is privileged, although it was volunteered.
The general rule formulated in Sunderlin v. Brad-
street is,- "A communication is privileged within the rule,
when made in good faith in answer to one having an interest
in the information sought, and it will be privileged, if vol-
unteered, when the party to whom the communication is made
has an interest in it, and the party by whom it is made
stands in such relation to him, as to make it a reasonable
duty, or at least proper, that he should give the information.
The communication made to those not interested was officious
and unauthorized and therefore not protected."
(a) Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188.
King v. Patterson, 49 N. J. L. 417.
Erher v. Dun, 4 McCrary (U. S.) 160.
Lock v. Bradstreet, 22 Fed. 771.
THE EXTENT OF THE PRIVILEGE TO AGENTS.
At one time it was sought to limit the privilege to
communications made between the agent and the principal, and
to hold that communications which were made to clerks or
(a)
agents of the inquirer were not privileged. This was over-
(b)
ruled in Erber v. Dun. "The distinction attempted to be drawn
between the right to resort to the services of an agent in
this and other legitimate business pursuits, is not well
founded. It is not in harmony with the known and universal
methods of conducting business. Commercial and other busi-
ness pursuits are conducted chiefly by partnerships and cor-
porations, and the former often, and the latter always, can
act only by agents, and any rule of law that would deny them
the right to avail themselves of tbe services of an agent in
every department of their business, and for every legitimate
purpose connected with' it, is unsound. What a man may law-
fully do himself, he may do by an agent. The distinction
taken between communications to a principal and to his agent,
is too refined. It is not supported by reason or authority."
These agencies can only carry on their work through
clerks and agents. The courts recognizing the conditions un-
der which modern business is transacted, have extended the
privilege to the clerks, agents, the printer and to the per-
son who furnishes information to the agency. Mellor, J. in
(a) Beardsley v. Tappan, 5 Blatchford (U. S.) 497.
(b) Erber v. Dun, 4 McCrary (U. S.) 160.
(a)
Lawless v, Anglo-Egyptian Co., said,- "I think that we should
be going against the progress of the age, if we were to hold
that the necessary publication of the manuscript to the print-
er, from the fact that the directors, in making the communi-
cation to the great body of the share-holders adopted print-
ing, Instead of employing confidential clerks to write a let-
ter to each share-holder, rendered the communication unpri-
vileged."
(a) Lawles v. Anglo-Egyptian Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 262.
THE QUESTION OF LIBEL.
Great ccre is taken in the preparation of these re-
ports to verify all facts which affect the reputation or fin-
ancial standing of a business man. But notwithstanding this
care, it is not strange that in the many reports in which are
rated every commercial firm of the country, errors sometimes
occur, which cause great injury to the reputation or credit
of some man, which the courts are called upon to redress.
Publications imputing incompetency in business or
insolvency, are libelous per se and are actionable without
(a)
proof of special injury. "The law guards most carefully the
credit of all merchants and traders. Any imputation as to
their solvency, any suggestion that they are in pecuniary
difficulties, or attempting to evade the operation of any
bankrupt law, is actionable per se." This has long been the
law in England and has been followed by the American Courts.
Words are actionable per se, when they impute fraud,
want of integrity, or mis-conduct in the line of business or
profession; and in those trades and professions in which,
ordinarily, credit is essential to success the language which
imputes to any one of such trade or profession a want of cre-
dit, or insolvency, past, present or future, is actionable
(b)
without proof of special injury.
"The law has always been very tender of the reputa-
(a) Odgers, Slander & Libel, 2d Eng. Ed., 51 & 61.
(b) Lock v. Bradstreet, 22 Fed. Rep. 771.
Herman v. Bradstreet, 19 Mo. Ap. 227.
Mitchell v. Bradstreet, 22 So. We. Rep. 635.
tion of tradesmen and therefore words spoken of them in the
way of their business will bear an action that will not be
(a)
actionable in the case of another person."
But the imputation must be express or directly to
be inferred from the words used. An inquiry, in confidence,
of a man as to the credit or indebtedness of another, has
been held not to impute a want of credit, and not to be ac-
(b)
tionable, except upon proof of special injury.
Where a firm by mistake was reported as having exe-
cuted a chattel mortgage, when in fact no such mortgage had
been given; the court held, that although the publication was
untrue, there could be no action unless damages could be
(c)
proved. It was not libelous per se.
In this same case the question arose as to asterisk
after the name of the firm. Evidence was offered to prove
that it was merely a notice to call at the office, and that
it was no imputation of insolvency or want of credit. The
court decided that this was a question for the jury, to deter-
mine from all the evidence whether the words "call at office"
were a libel.
In New York the contrary doctrine seems to be the
law. Where there was an asterisk after the name and at the
foot of the page the words "refer to office" the court decid-
ed that this was not a libel, nor were the words ambiguous,
so as to admit testimony concerning the effect of the words
(a) Goldsmith v. Glatz, 6 N. Y. State Rep. 635.
(b) Newell v. How, 31 Min. 235.
(c) Newbold v. Bradstreet, 57 Md. 38.
(a)
on the plaintiff's creditors. This decision of the General
Term of the Supreme Court was affirmed by the Court of Ap-
(b)
peals, holding that where an alleged libel consists of a name
followed by asterisks, with no proof of any meaning attached,
except the testimony of the superintendent,, who testified
that they referred to the marginal note directing persons de-
sirous of information to call at the office; a verdict for
the defendant should be directed, as the characters are not
libelous per se, and are not shown to have any libelous sig-
nification.
The report that a judgment has been recovered
against.a firm, has been held not to be an imputation against




Bradstreet v. Gill was a case in which a firm was
rated in blank. This was shown to signify to subscribers
that the firm had no standing at all, and although there were
no words at all, the court held that the absence of any rat-
ing at all was a libel from which the law would infer damages
as being necessarily occasioned.
(e)
In Lewis v. Chapman a banker had written confiden-
tially to his correspondent in New York, that he had been ob-
liged to hold a note a few days for the accommodation of the
plaintiff. This was not a libel per se. It was a usual thing
(a) Kingsbury v. Bradstreet, 35 Hun. 16.
(b) Kingsbury v. Bradstreet, 116 N. Y. 211.
(c) Woodruff v. Bradstreet, 116 N. Y. 217.
(d) Bradstreet v. Gill, 72 Texas 115.
(e) Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 370.
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in business thus to accommodate a firm by carrying its paper
over a few days after maturity, and was not an imputation of
insolvency or lack or credit.
Where the publication is libelous per se and its
publication is admitted, and proof being given that it was
sent to all the subscribers of any agency, the only question
(a)
for the jury is the amount of damages.
The jury must decide this amount from the general
effect of the libel on the plaintiff's character and credit
as a merchant, and the opinion of witnesses as to the general
effect of such rating on the credit of the plaintiff in fin-
(b)
ancial circles, is not admissible.
(a) Mitchell v. Bradstreet, 22 So. W. Rep. 724.
(b) Bradstreet v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115.
RATINGS IN CIPHER.
The fact that the libel complained of is in cipher,
is not material. The holdings of the courts are uniform on
(a)
this point. In Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, in regard to the
question of cipher the court said:- "It was in the language
understood by the numerous patrons of the agency, and all the
subscribers to the publication had the key to the cipher and
the publication was equally significant and injurious as if
made in the distinct terms in the very words indicated by the
numerical figures."
(a) Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188.
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS AS TO HIS OWN CREDIT.
One of the methods by which the agency obtains in-
formation is to inquire of the person himself as to his fin-
ancial condition. Sometimes this is done because some sub-
scriber is -seeking such information of the agency; and some-
times for the purpose of rating him in the report, although
no subscriber has made inquiries.
The person of whom the inquiries are made does not
know who it is who desires the information, but he does know
that it may be reported to someone interested in him, and who
may rely on any representation he may make as to his standing.
The fact that the information is not communicated directly to
the person who brings the action, but indirectly through the
agency, has uniformly been held not to relieve a man from re-
sponsibility for the injury which his wrongful act has caused.
False representations as to his own pecuniary re-
sponsibility made to a mercantile agency are made with the
knowledge that someone may act on them, and as a man is pre-
sumed in law to intend the natural and probable consequences
of his acts, therefore such representations are presumed to
be made with the intent to procure credit, and thus to de-
fraud those who may be misled, relying on the truth of the
representations, and they furnish ground for an action of de-
(a)
ceit against the person making them.
(a) Con v. Harley, 7 Met. 462.
Holmes v. Harrington, 20 Mo. Ap. 661.
Lindonert v. Hay, 61 Iowa 664.
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(a)
The leading case in point is Eaton v. Avery, which
was an action in deceit in obtaining the sale and delivery of
goods be means of false representations made by the defendant
as to the pecuniary condition of his firm; not directly to
the plaintiff, but indirectly through a commercial agency to
which the plaintiff was a subscriber. Rapallo, Justice, in
his opinion, said: "On this point we are of the opinion that
the law was correctly stated in the charge below, where-in
the judge instructed the jury, that the defendant, when he
was called upon by the agent of the agency made statements
alleged, as to the capital of his firm, and that they were
false and were known to be so, by the defendant, and were
made with the intent that they should be communicated to and
believed by persons interested in ascertaining the pecuniary
responsibility of the firm, and with the intent to procure
credit and to defraud such persons thereby, and such state-
ments were communicated to plaintiff and relied upon by it,
and the alleged sale was procured thereby. The plaintiff was
entitled to recover. The rule thus laid down accords with
the principles of adjudication in analogous cases, in which
it has been held that it is not essential that a representa-
tion should be addressed directly to the party who seeks a
(b)
remedy for having been deceived and defrauded thereby."
A false representation had been made in Commonwealth
(c)
v. Call; had been communicated to an agent and by him to his
(a)Eaton v. Avery, 83 N. Y. 31.
(b) Morgan v. Skiddy, 62 N. Y. 319.
(c) Commonwealth v. Call, 21 Pick. 515.
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principal. The court said that: "A false representation made
to an agent and communicated by him to his principal, upon
which he acted, was in legal contemplation a false represent-
ation to the principal himself. It was designed to influence
him, and whether communicated to him directly, or through the
intervention of an agent, can make no difference. It was in-
tended to reach and operate on his mind. It is immaterial
whether it passed through a direct or circuitous channel."
(a)
In Bank v. Barge Co., the court said: "We think a
person furnishing information to a commercial agency, as to
his means and pecuniary responsibility, is to be presumed to
have done so, to enable the agency to communicate the same to
persons interested, for their guidance in giving credit to
him, and so long as such intention exists, and the represent-
ations reach the persons for whom they were intended, it is
immaterial whether they passed through a direct channel or
otherwise, provided they were reported by the agency as made
by the party."
The false representations must be so proximately
connected with the transaction, in which the plaintiff alleges
he was deceived, as to make it appear that the defendant in-
tended that representation to be relied on and not one made
subsequently.
The Court of Appeals refused to extend the doctrine
(b)
of Eaton v. Avery to the facts of the case of McCullon v.
(a) Genesee Co. Sav. Bank v. T ich. Barge Co., 52 Trich. 164.
(b) Eaton v. Avery, 83 11. Y. 31.
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(a)
Mcirinley. In the first case there was a direct and intended
connection between the representation and the credit obtained.
The report given in August was referred to when application
was made for credit in September, and goods were delivered on
the faith of it. To the creditors in that case tt was a
present communication. In McCullon v. McKinley, however, the
credit was given six months after the representations had
been made. This credit had been refused by former vendors of
the defendant to the knowledge of the plaintiff. It cannot
be said that they relied on the representations.
Evidence of Intent:-
To entitle evidence of former representations to be
admitted it must be shown that plaintiff knew of and relied
on them prior to the transaction, in which he claims to have
been defrauded.
(b)
In Robinson v. Levi the purchaser had made a state-
ment of his financial standing several months before the
sale, to a commercial agency. The court held that if known
to the vendor before or at the time of sale it would be rele-
vant and admissible as evidence on the question of fraud, but
it is not admissible where it was shown to have been examined
on the day after the sale.
The question of an extension of credit on the faith
(c)
of such representations arose in Kramer v. Wilson. It was
held that evidence of statements concerning his condition
(a) McCullon v. McKinley, 99 N. Y. 353.
(b) Robinson v. Levi, 81 Ala. 134.
(c) Kramer v. Wilson, 22 Mo. Ap. 173.
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made by the defendant to the agency six weeks before suit is
brought is admissible as to questions of intent. But state-
ments made by a mercantile agency, as to the debtors standing,
upon the faith of which the plaintiff had extended credit,
are not admissible on such an issue.
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS AS TO TITIBD PARTIES.
(a)
In the only case which seems to have arisen, it was
held that while the reports of mercantile agencies to inter-
ested clients are held privileged communications, this pro-
tection would not be extended to a person responding to a
request from the agency for information in regard to a third
person.
This was not the decision of a court of last re-
sort and it seems, that on principle, the Court of Appeals
would recogntze the modern extension of the privilege to all
the instrumentalities and agents of the agency, and follow
(b)
the dicta of Woodruff, Justice, in Ormsby v. Douglas. "As a
necessary consequence they make inquiries of other merchants
or of any person who may have information, and if such mer-
chant or other person in good faith communicates what he has,
or thinks he has, the communication is privileged."
(a) Albany Law Journal, Vol. I, p 323.
(b) Ormsby v. Douglas, 37 N. Y. 484.
CONTRACTS LIMITING LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE.
Mercantile agencies, unlike common carriers and inn
keepers, are not engaged in a business of such a public nat-
ure as to demand that their contracts releasing them from
liability for negligence of their agents shall be held inval-
(a)
id. The contract in Duncan v. Dun exempted the agency from
liability for all negligence of its agents. The plaintiff
sought to limit this to ordinary negligence, but Butler, J.,
in his opinion, said: "For this we can find no warrant and no
reason can be seen why they should be less anxious for pro-
tection against gross than against common negligence from
this source."
The law holds the principal responsible for the
acts of his agent done within the scope of his authority.
Mercantile agencies are within this rule, except where, by
contract, as is almost invariably the case, they relieve
themselves from all responsibility for loss or injury caused
by neglect or other act of any officer, agent or employee, in
procuring, collecting and communicating information.
The law permits persons to protect themselves, by
contract, against the negligence of their agents, a privi-
lege which is generally not allowed common carriers, inn
keepers, or persons engaged in a calling of a public nature.
A mercantile agency is not an exercise of a public calling and
is restrained only by the law of principal and agent.
(a) Duncan v. Dun, 9 C. L. J. 151.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
(a)
In the case of Pasley v. Freeman it was decided by
the English courts that the fourth section of the Statute of
Frauds, which provided, inter alia, "That no action shall be
brought crhereby to charge the defendant, upon any special
promise, to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of
another person, unless the agreement or some memorandum or
note thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the party to
be charged therewith, or some other person there-unto by him
lawfully authorized", applied only to contracts, and Freeman
was held liable for false representations as to the credit
of one Falch, and established the doctrine that an action for
deceit could be brought though the representatfons were only
verbal. These facts were clearly within the mischief sought
to be remedied by the statute, and more than one hundred and
fifty years after the passage of the Statute of Frauds, Par-
liament enacted in the 9 Geo. IV, chap. 14, sec. 6, known as
Lord Tenterden's Act; "That no action shall be brought where-
by to charge any person upon, or by reason of, any represent-
ation, or assurance made or given concerning or relating to
the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade or dealings of
any other person, to the intent or purpose that such other
person may obtain credit, money or goods thereupon, unless
such representation or assurance be made in writing signed by
the party to be charged therewith."
(a) Pasley v. Freeman, 2 Smith's Leading Cases 55.
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Similar statutes have been passed in Alabama, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Oregon, South Carolina,
(a)
Vermont ard Virginia.
This statute first came before the courts for in-
(b)
terpretation in McLean v. Dun, in which a false report was
given by the agency orally to the plaintiff, who charged that
the agency had not exercised ordinary care in ascertaining
the mercantile standing of Wilson before making the report,
but that they had wholly neglected so to do. The defense
rested on the statute. The court below decided that it was
not enough for defendants to show that the representation is
under the statute, to defeat the action. They must satisfy
the court that the action is upon, or by reason of, the re-
presentations. This was an action for breach of contract.
The Court of Appeals, with a divided bench, reversed this and
granted a non-suit. Burton, J. said, "Granting that the
action is founded on the defendant0 want of care, in per-
forming their contract, the plaintiff fails to show any right
to recover damages unless he proves the representation and
that he acted on it. To do this he is driven to prove the
representations given verbally to his clerk, and if the statute
forbids this, his action to that extent fails."
(c)
This same question arose in Sprague v. Dun. Hare,
P. J. said: "It is an established rule that remedial statutes
shall be read with a due regard for the object which the Leg-
(a) Errants Mercantile Agencies, p 63.
(b) McLean v. Dun, Upper Canada, 39 Q. B. 551.
(c) Sprague v. Dun, 16 Phila. 310.
islature had in view, and this in the case of the act in
question was not to relax the bonds of contract, but to guard
against loose and unfortunate charges of fraud, and the agree-
ment into which the defendants entered was a waiver of the
right to take advantage of the statute."
It seems that the law is the other way; to prove a
breach of contract or negligence, it is necessary to give
evidence of the representations, and this cannot be done un-
der the statute unless these representations are in writing.
In those states, therefore, in which this act has
been adopted, the agencies can only be held when the repre-
sentations are in writing.
INJUNCTION.
Mercantile Agencies cannot be restrained by in-
junction at the suit of one'whose financial standing is about
to be published. Equity has no jurisdiction in such a case
(a)
unless there is a breach of trust or contract involved.
(b)
In Raymond v. Russell, Martin, a. J. said: "it is
not within the jurisdiction of a court of equity to restrain
by injunction representations about to be made as to the char-
acter and standing of the plaintiff, or as to his property,
although such representations may be false, if there is no
breach of trust or contract involved."
- -
(a) Whitehead v. Kitson, 119 Mass. 484.
Boston Dialite Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 114 Mass. 69.
(b) Raymond v. Russell, 143 Mass. 295.

